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  Abstract 
This paper presents a time-continuous goal-based portfolio selection model with cumulative 
prospect theory preferences and satisficing behavior, where investors optimally split their 
wealth among several investment goals at different horizons. The paper extends the model 
of Berkelaar, Kouwenberg and Post (2004) to account for multiple-goals. We show that 
when the discounted values of all target wealths is not too high relative to the initial wealth 
(i.e., goals are not too ambitious), investors mainly invest to reach short-term investment 
goals and adopt safe investment strategies for this purpose. However, when goals are very 
ambitious, they put a high proportion of their wealth in long-term goals and adopt aggressive 
investment strategies with high leverage to reach short-term goals and the overall 
investment strategy also displays high leverage. High incentives to reach ambitious short-
term goals (high target returns) and the consequent excessive leverage have been identified 
as causes for the global financial crisis erupted in 2008. 
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prospect theory, satisficing, loss aversion, goal-based approach. 
 





Portfolio selection models typically assume that investors derive utility from consumption
or total wealth. In this paper we consider the case of investors with several investment
goals, possibly at dierent time horizons, who derive utility from portfolio payos' relative
to goals' specic target payos. Additionally, they narrowly frame their investment goals,
i.e., consider each investment goal separately from the others.
This way of structuring the portfolio decision problem derives from how people tend
to organize and evaluate their investments, that is mental accounting as dened by Thaler
(1985). From this perspective, investors do not consider the overall portfolio performance,
but evaluate investment decisions relative to whether or not they have been able to reach
their investment goals.1 Since goals are often related to specic achievements in peo-
ple's life (e.g., retirement, own house) investor tend to keep them into dierent mental
accounts (e.g., \I have invested for my retirement", \I have invested to buy an house").
Accordantly, each investment goal denes a unique decision problem and a goal's specic
portfolio is determined.2
1There is also considerable evidence that managers do think in terms of goals as given by target
returns; Mao (1970), for instance, interviews a number of executives for their denition of risk, and one
representative response from these executives is \Risk is the prospect of not meeting the target rate of
return."
2Full separation of goals' specic portfolios is a rather extreme assumption on how mental accounting
might aect investors' decisions. In the model presented in this paper, goals are partially integrated since
investors decide how to optimally split wealth among them. Accordantly, if one goal is more ambitious
(or more important) than other goals, investors might put a higher proportion of their wealth on it and
use a safe investment strategy for it. On the other hand, less wealth will be available for the other goals,
1There is a growing consensus among wealth managers, that mental accounting should
be addressed when structuring the advisory process of nancial institutions. Adherent to
this line of thoughts, advocate the use of goal-based approaches to the asset allocation
problem; see Brunel (2006), Chhabra (2005), Nevin (2004) and Brunel (2003). They argue
that an investment strategy is only useful when investors are able to follow it even under
unfavorable market conditions. Goal-based models are inspired by how individuals look
at their investment strategies. Goal-based approaches are two-step approaches. First,
the investor decides how to split her wealth among the dierent investment goals. Sec-
ond, each investment goal is treated separately and a specic portfolio decision problem
is solved. This considerably simplies the portfolio decision process and facilitates the
interaction between investors and nancial advisors, so that investors are more likely to
understand and follow their strategies. By contrast, traditional portfolio models might
force investors into pre-dened modeling frameworks which do not necessarily reect their
goals, biases and risk perception. Without accounting for these characteristics, it is hard
to believe that investors will stick at their asset allocation also during unfavorable market
conditions. Indeed, individual investors displays high trading levels, which causes huge
performance penalties (Barber and Odean 2000).
This paper presents a time-continuous goal-based model that uses cumulative prospect
theory (CPT) of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) to describe investors' preferences. The
paper extends to a multiple-goal setting the model presented by Berkelaar, Kouwenberg,
and Post (2004). Cumulative prospect theory is one of the pillars of behavioral economics
which might force investors to adopt aggressive investment strategies.
2and behavioral nance and has successfully been applied in nance to address several
puzzles arising from standard economic models based on expected utility theory, both
concerning individual portfolio choices and asset prices; see Barberis and Thaler (2003)
for an overview. Being a referent-dependent theory of choice, cumulative prospect theory
provides an adequate setting for integrating investment goals into a portfolio theory.
Cumulative prospect theory assumes that investors display a risk seeking behavior on
losses (e.g., payos below the reference point): investors are willing to take risk in order
to avoid missing their investment goals for sure. This behavior has been documented in
several experimental works. Recently, the risk attitude of fund managers has also been
related to their contractual incentives. Dass, Massa, and Patgiri (2008) found that mutual
fund managers with high contractual incentives to rank at the top (i.e., those with more
ambitious investment goals) adopted riskier investment strategies.
Cumulative prospect theory also assumes that investors are loss averse. Loss aversion
is the observation that people usually require n > 1 units of payo above the reference
point in order to be compensated for one unit of payo below the reference point, where
n can be seen as the degree of loss aversion. However, when the investors' only objective
is to reach several predened gaols, it seems plausible to assume that any payo above
the target payo is considered as fully satisfactory, and additional units of payo above
the reference point in scenarios where they already reach their goals do not compensate
them for scenarios where they fail their goals. When investors are not fully satised with
a portfolio's payo that is (just slightly) above their target payo, then they should bet-
3ter re-dene their goals and aim to a higher target payo. By contrast, we believe that
investors strictly prefer being just slightly below the target payo to being well-below it.
The behavior we just described is strictly related to the concept of satiscing introduced
by Simon (1955) and we thus call it satiscing behavior.
Simon (1955) argues that people's computational abilities are limited and we should
better model their preferences using simple value functions, which only take, e.g., three
values -1, 0 or 1, with the interpretation that the outcome is unsatisfactory, neutral, or
satisfactory, respectively. Simon (1955) also states that whether or not a given outcome
is considered satisfactory depends on a pre-dened aspiration level (or reference point in
case of monetary alternatives). We point out that satiscing behavior does not mean that
people' nal objective is not to optimize. People who display satisncing behavior might
converge to optimal solutions as they redene their investment goals. First, they dene
goals and are fully satised when they reach them. Second, they dene new goals which
are more ambitious than the previous ones. As in Simon (1955) we assume that payos
above the reference point are satisfactory; in our model this means that they all have
value zero, as the reference point. Dierently from Simon (1955) we allow investors to
attribute dierent values to payos below the reference point.
In this paper we use a slightly dierent specication of the CPT-value function if
compared to Tversky and Kahneman (1992). While we also adopt the piecewise-power
and kinked value function, we use two dierent parameters to specify the degree of loss
aversion. This doesn't have any impact on investors optimal strategies, but it allows us to
4also characterizes investors with satiscing behavior. This is the case when the degree of
loss aversion is very high. The intuition for this is straightforward: when investors' only
objective is to reach their goals and all payos above the reference point are considered as
fully satisfactory, then any payo (even if large) in scenarios where goals will be reached
do not compensate investors for failing the reference point in other scenarios.
The goal-based model presented in this paper is well-suited to study how investors al-
locate their wealth between short-, medium- and long-term investment goals. We address
the question whether investors with several investment goals at dierent horizons mainly
invest to reach short-, medium or long-term investment goals. It is well-known that cumu-
lative prospect theory investors put a smaller proportion of their wealth in stocks when the
investment horizon is short; see Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Berkelaar, Kouwenberg,
and Post (2004). By contrast, when the investment horizon is medium- or long, stocks are
very attractive also to cumulative prospect theory investors. Benartzi and Thaler (1995)
suggest that investors' strategies are mainly determined by how often investors evaluate
them (the so called evaluation period). Accordingly, while the investment horizon might
be long, investors tend to make investment decisions based on short evaluation periods
and consequently only put a small proportion of their wealth in stocks. This explains the
observed low participation to equity markets (Mankiw and Zeldes 1991) and the equity
premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985).
Short evaluation periods can be easily explained by the fact that investors usually
receive their nancial statements on yearly base. However, when investors with cumula-
5tive prospect theory preferences possess multiple investment goals at dierent horizons,
we show that it is optimal for investors to focus on long-term goals, unless their inter-
temporal discount rate is very high. In this paper we show that the same is not true when
investors display the satiscing behavior we described before. We see that when goals are
not too ambitious, investors with satiscing behavior optimally puts a high proportion of
their wealth into short-term investment goals, which are more dicult to reach given the
smaller upside potential over shorter periods of time. We show that the overall investment
strategy appears to be biased toward short-term goals in the sense that the probability
to reach those goals is signicantly higher than the probability to reach long-term goals.
This result also holds when the equity premium is high. Moreover, when investment goals
are not too ambitious, investors with satiscing behavior puts a small proportion of their
wealth in risky assets.
By contrast, when investment goals are too ambitious, investors with satiscing be-
havior mainly invest to reach long-term investment goals, while they adopt aggressive
investment strategies in order to achieve short-term goals. This is due to cumulative
prospect theory preferences, which imply a risk seeking behavior on losses. Even if the
long-term strategies are less aggressive, when investment goals are too ambitious the
overall investment strategy displays a high leverage ratio. We note that high incentives
to reach ambitious short-term goals (high target returns) and the consequent excessive
leverage have been identied as causes for the global nancial crisis erupted in 2008 (see
Shefrin 2009).
6The model presented in this paper is related to the behavioral portfolio theory (BPT)
of Shefrin and Statman (2000). However, beside the fact that we use cumulative prospect
theory to model investors' preferences, while the BPT is build on the SP/A theory of
Lopes (1987), our model diers from BPT in many directions. First, it is a continuous-
time model, while BPT is a static model. This allows us to consider investment goals at
dierent horizons. As far as we know, this paper is the rst one which considers a portfolio
model where mental accounting refers to investment goals at possibly dierent investment
horizons. Second, in this paper how investors' wealth is allocated among investment goals
is determined endogenously, while in BPT this is exogenously given. Finally, our model
also allow us to study investors who display satiscing behavior, as discussed above.
Mental accounting in a mean-variance framework has been studied by Das, Markowitz,
Scheid, and Statman (2009). Also their model is static and how wealth is allocated among
investment goals is exogenously given. The main result in Das, Markowitz, Scheid, and
Statman (2009) is that in their setting portfolios with mental accounting belongs to the
mean-variance ecient frontier if short-sale is allowed, i.e., mental accounting does not
introduce ineciency. We show that a similar result holds with CPT preferences and
satiscing behavior.
As we discussed above, this paper also relates to Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and
Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004). Dierently from these papers, here we don't
address the question about how CPT strategies change as function of the time horizon
(even if this is a by-product of the analysis), but we look at how CPT investors with
several investments goals (at dierent horizons) split their wealth among them.
7The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the goal-
based model while Section 3 presents numerical examples to illustrate our results. Sec-
tion 4 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Goal-based Investment Model
2.1 The Economy
We assume a standard, continuous-time nancial market as described in Karatzas and
Shreve (1998). There are K + 1 assets with price Sk(t) at time t for k = 0;:::;K. The
zero-th asset is a risk-free asset S0(t):
(2.1) dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt
where r() is the interest rate process. The remaining assets are risky and follow an Ito
process
(2.2) dSk(t) = k(t)Sk(t)dt + Sk(t)
K X
l=1
kl(t)dBl(t); k = 1;:::;K
with drift rates k() and volatility components kl(). The processes r(), () = (1;:::;K)
and () = (kl)k;l=1;:::;K are progressively measurable with respect to the ltration gen-
erated by the K-dimensional Browniam motion B = (B1;:::;BK)0 and satisfy the usual
regularity conditions (Karatzas and Shreve 1998, Denition 1.3).
We assume a complete market. This is the case when the volatility matrix (t) has
full rank for all t and there exists a K-dimensional progressively measurable process 
8such that (t)(t) = (t)   1r(t) almost surely for all t, where 1 is a K-dimensional
vector of 1. Under market completeness, there exists a unique pricing kernel :




















=  r(t)dt   (t)
0 dB(t); (0) = 0 = 1:
2.2 Investor's Preferences
The investor possesses J dierent investment goals, which can be characterized by target
payos W j the clients wants to obtain at time Tj, for j = 1;:::;J. At time t she
allocates a fraction wj(t) of her wealth W(t) to goal j and chooses goal-specic portfolios
j(t) = (j;1(t);:::;j;K)0, where j;k(t) is the fraction of wealth Wj(t) = wj(t)W(t)
allocated to the asset k at time t. We put W0 = W(0) and wj;0 = wj(0).3 The wealth
dynamics for goal j is given as follows:
dWj(t) = r(t)Wj(t)dt+((t) 1r(t))
0 j(t)Wj(t)dt+(t)
0j(t)Wj(t)dB(t); Wj(0) = wj;0 W0:
The investor derives utility from each goal separately at the corresponding horizons
Tj. This reects two kinds of mental accounting the investor has. First, each invest-
3Target payos are assumed to be exogenously given and xed. However, we could easily extends our
model to allow target payos to be endogenous and stochastic. For example, if the target wealth for goal
j is the value at time Tj of a benchmark portfolio b(t), then we simply take the dierence Wj(t) Wb(t)
where Wb(t) is the wealth level at time t obtained the initial wealth Wj(0) is invested in b(t). Since
Wj(t)   Wb(t) also follows an Ito process, we can apply the same technology to extend our model to the
case where target payos are endogenous and stochastic; see Jin and Zhou (2008).
9ment goal is considered as a separate account and the covariances between goal-specic
portfolios are ignored. This is similar to the behavioral portfolio theory of Shefrin and
Statman (2000) or the model with narrow framing introduced by Barberis and Huang
(2001). Second, dierent time horizons are not integrated, i.e., in order to reach a given
investment goal the investor does not take into account portfolios which are related to
investment goals with longer horizons. We therefore assume that wealths Wj(Tj) are fully
consumed at time Tj, even if the investor is not able to reach her goal (Wj(Tj) < W j) or
there exists a surplus (Wj(Tj) > W j). In our model we will see that in case Wj(Tj) < W j,
then Wj(Tj) = 0, i.e., there is nothing to consume relative to goal j when goal j is not
reached.
Mental accounting with respect to the time horizon has been addressed by Benartzi
and Thaler (1995), who show that a cumulative prospect theory investor with a invest-
ment horizon of one year or less will prefer bonds to stocks, while the preferences revert
if the horizon is longer than one year. In order to explain the equity premium puzzle, Be-
nartzi and Thaler (1995) distinguish between investment horizon and evaluation period.
They introduce the concept of myopic loss aversion which refers to the fact that investors
perceive risk (and behave accordantly) in correspondence of their evaluation period which
is usually much shorter than the investment horizon. Therefore, even if their investment
horizon is long, investors chooses their investment strategies according to their evaluation
period, which is short. In this paper we don't distinguish between investment horizon
and evaluation period, but argue that investors might have investment goals at dierent
horizons. We address the question about how a CPT investor optimally allocates wealth
10between the dierent investment goals.
The value function for goal j corresponds to the cumulative prospect theory value
function
(2.4) Vj(W;W j) =
Z Wj
 1





vj(x   W j)d
+
j (1   FW(x))
where vj(x) is a piecewise-power value function:
(2.5) vj(x) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :

+
j xj x > 0;
 
 
j ( x)j; x  0;
and j;+, j;  are non-decreasing, continuous probability weighting functions from [0;1]
into [0;1] with 

j (p) = p for p = 0;1, 

j (p) > p for p small and 






j  0 and j 2 (0;1). FW denotes the cumulative distribution
function of the random payo W.
We use a slightly dierent notation for the value function than suggested by Tver-










Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post 2004). The reason for this notation, is that it allows
to also describe investors who are extremely loss averse for some investment goals, i.e.,
j ! 1. This corresponds to the case 
+
j ! 0, i.e., the investor doesn't obtain any
positive value for being above the target wealth, but only a negative value for being be-
low it. The case 
+
j = 0 for all j is important because it characterizes investors who
11are only concerned about reaching their investment goals, while they don't receive any
additional value from payos which are strictly above their target payo levels. This type
of investors display satiscing behavior. Satiscing, as opposed to maximizing, assumes
that investors consider all payos above the reference point as fully satisfactory; see Simon
(1955). Recently, Brown and Sim (2009) and Brown, De Giorgi, and Sim (2009) presented
an axiomatic foundation of preferences with satiscing behavior.
2.3 Investor's Decision Problem
Given her preferences as described in the previous section, the investor determines at each
time t how to optimally split wealth among the dierent investment goals and, addition-
ally, how to optimally invest the wealth amounts allocated to the dierent investment







such that for j = 1;:::;J
dWj(t) = r(t)Wj(t)dt + ((t)   1r(t))
0 j(t)Wj(t)dt + (t)
0j(t)Wj(t)dB(t); (2.6)




The constant   1 is the discount factor and characterizes the investor's time preferences,
i.e., her preference for immediate consumption relative to consumption far in the future.
In order to avoid concentration in few asset classes, we could add additional constraints
on investment strategies, e.g.,
PJ
j=1 j;k(t) 2 (min
k ;max
k ).
12To keep analytical tractability, we assume no probability weighting, i.e., 

j (p) = p for
all j = 1;:::;J and p 2 [0;1]. This is a common assumption in behavioral nance.4 For
the discussion and the results in this paper probability weighting is not crucial.










vj(Wj(Tj)   W j)

such that
E[(Tj)Wj(Tj)]  0 wj;0 W0




The vector w0 = (w1;0;:::;wJ;0)0 corresponds to the wealth's shares at time t = 0. At
time t = 0 the investor decides how to split wealth among the J investment goals. Con-
sequently, she allocates Wj(0) = wj;0 W0 to goal j, which corresponds to the budget
constraint for this goal. Initial wealth shares and the corresponding goal-specic terminal
wealths determine the investor's global value she obtains from the J dierent investment
goals.
We solve Problem (2.7) in two stages. First, for a given vector of initial wealth shares
w0 = (w1;0;:::;wJ;0)0, we solve for each investment goal j the following goal-specic
4Exceptions are De Giorgi, Hens, and Levy (2003), Levy and Levy (2004), Barberis and Huang (2008),






vj(Wj(Tj)   W j)

such that
E[(Tj)Wj(Tj)]  0 wj;0 W0 (2.8)
Wj(Tj)  0:
The optimal terminal wealths obviously depend on w0 since wealth shares at time 0 dene
the budget constraints for all investment goals. Second, given optimal terminal wealths
W ?
j (Tj) for all goals as function of w0, we nd the optimal vector of shares w?
0 that










j (Tj)   W j)

such that




We point out that in our model, goals' specic portfolios are somehow related, even if
the portfolio decision problem for each goal does not directly account for the investment
strategies for the other goals. This can be seen as follows: if one goal is very ambitious
or very important so that it is optimal for the investor to put a high proportion of her
wealth on it, then less wealth will be available for other goals and the investors might
use aggressive investment strategies (given her risk seeking behavior on losses) for them.
Therefore, the investor might nally end up with aggressive investment strategies for al-
most all goals, while she safely invest to reach few important goals.
14The following Proposition gives the solution to Problem (2.8):
Proposition 2.1. Let w0 = (w1;0;:::;wJ;0)0 be a vector of initial wealth shares. Then for





> > > > > > > > > > <







; if (Tj) < ?
j(yj)




j(yj);yj) = 0 and yj  0 satises E[(Tj)Wj(Tj)] = 0 wj;0 W0.
















where x;y > 0.
Optimal terminal wealths W ?
j (Tj) present the following characteristic. In good states of
the world at time Tj ((Tj) < ?
j(yj)) the investor is able to reach her investment goal W j.
In this case there is a strictly positive surplus (
+
j j=(yj j(Tj)))1=(1 j) which increases as
j(Tj) becomes smaller. By contrast, in bad states of the world at time Tj ((Tj) < ?
j(yj))
the investor fails to reach her goal and her terminal wealth is zero. The probability of
beating the investment goal corresponds to the probability that (Tj)  ?(yj). We will
provide an explicit expression for this probability under further assumptions on the dy-
namics of t.
15In order to derive optimal initial wealth shares w?
0, we need to understand how W ?
j (Tj)
depends on w0. For sake of simplicity, we drop the index j in our discussion below, since
the results apply to all investment goals. When it is not confusing we denote by w0 the
wealth share allocated to one specic investment goal. The following Lemma provides an
explicit characterization of ?(y).
Lemma 2.1. Let x;y > 0 and g : R2
+ ! R be dened as in Equation (2.11). Then for











We impose additional conditions on the dynamics of the stochastic discount factor t.
We assume that the interest rate process r, the drift process  and the volatility matrix
 are constant. Let m =  (r + (1=2)jjjj2) and s2 = jjjj2. Then (T) is log-normally
distributed with parameters mT = mT and sT = s
p
T. Under these conditions, we
can easily determine the probability of reaching an investment goal at the time horizon
T, which corresponds to ((log(?(y)   mT)=sT)). We also obtain an explicit characteri-
zation of the parameter y which satises the budget constraint for W ?(T) in Prosition 2.1.
Lemma 2.2. Let W ?(T) be the optimal wealth from Proposition 2.1. Then y > 0 solves
E[(T)W
?(T)] = 0 w0 W0:
if and only if y > 0 solves h(y) = w0 where:
(2.13) h(y) = b















16The constant a > 0 solves Equation (2.12) from Lemma 2.1, b = W
0 W0 exp( rT) and
c = 1












The function h is strictly decreasing. Therefore y decreases as the initial share allo-
cated to one investment goal increases. Consequently, ? becomes larger, i.e., the probabil-
ity of reaching the investment goal is higher as more wealth is allocated to that investment
goal. Moreover, for y and   x, h(y) strictly increases as + increases, i.e., as loss aver-
sion decreases. Consequently, y decreases with loss aversion, i.e., as loss aversion aversion
increases the probability of reaching the investment goal increases, but the surplus be-
comes smaller. The probability of reaching the investment goal is therefore maximal when
+ = 0, which implies satiscing behavior.
When h(y) = w0 possesses a solution, then it is unique since h is strictly decreasing.
For + > 0, h(y) = w0 possesses a solution for all w0. However, for + = 0, h(y) = w0
cannot be solved for w0 > b since h(y) 2 [0;b] for all y  0. For the case + = 0 we
will impose some further conditions on b when we solve for the vector of wealth share
(w1;0;:::;wJ;0)0. If + = 0 and w0  b we obtain an explicit solution for y as function of
w0:
Corollary 2.1. Let h be as given by Equation (2.13). Let + = 0 and w0 < b. Then
h(y) = w0 if and only if
(2.14) y = a exp
 
 sT 





where b = W
0 W0 exp( rT).
17Note that for + = 0, the optimal terminal wealth W ?
T does not depend on  . Indeed,
  only enters into ?(y) through the constant a. However, since ?(y) = a=y we have
?(y) = exp(sT  1(w0=b) + mT + s2
T), which is independent from a. More generally, the
following results holds:
Corollary 2.2. The optimal terminal wealth W ?(T) depends on + and   only trough
the ratio  =+, i.e., the degree of loss aversion.
The following Lemma gives an explicit characterization of the optimal utility level
E[W ?(T)] as function of y:
Lemma 2.3. We have E[W ?(T)] = k(y) where


























. The function k is continuous, strictly decreasing
and limy!1 k(y) = 0.
We now rewrite Problem (2.9) as follows. Optimal wealths W1(T1);:::;WJ(TJ) are















18In general, Problem (2.16) must be solved numerically, since no explicit expression for
h
 1
j is available. We present some numerical exercises in Section 3. Before we discuss a
special case where solutions to Problem (2.16) can be derived analytically, we report here
optimal wealths and optimal strategies for all investment goals and at any time t 2 [0;Tj]:



















log(=(t)) + (r   1

























2 (T   t): (2.20)










j(t) = 0 for t > Tj.
The optimal strategy j(t) = (j;1;:::;j;K(t))0 for investment goal j at any time

































19where ' = 0 is the density function of the standard normal distribution.
2.4 Optimal Wealth Shares with Satiscing Behavior
We now consider investors who display satiscing behavior, i.e., 
+
j = 0 for all j. In this
case Problem (2.16) is analytically tractable since we have an explicit expression for h
 1
j .
As discussed before, satiscing behavior describes investors who are only concerned about
reaching their investment goals, while a surplus above their target wealth does not deliver
any additional value to them. In our opinion this is the typical case when investment
goals have been clearly specied.
When 
+
j = 0 for all j, we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3. Let 
+
j = 0 for all j. Let bj = W j exp( rTj)=(0 W0) and assume
that
PJ





> > > > > > > > > > <

























j=1 bj  1 is equivalent to
P
j=1 W j exp( rTj)  W0, i.e., the dis-
counted value of all target wealths must be larger than or equal to the initial wealth.
If the discounted value of all target wealths is strictly larger than the initial wealth
20(
PJ
j=1 bj > 1) then we have  > 0 and the investor invests some of her wealth into
the risky assets. Therefore, in this case, the volatility of the market price of risk s and
the inter-temporal discount factor  enter into the expression for wealth shares w?
j;0. If
P
j=1 W j exp( rTj) = W0, then   0 and the investor can reach all investment goals
with probability one by simply putting all her wealth into the risk-free asset. Therefore,
in this case, w?
j;0 simply corresponds to bj, that is the ratio between the discounted value
of the target wealth for goal j and the initial wealth.
The ratio bj can be interpreted as a measures of how ambitious an investment goal is
relative to the initial wealth. Obviously, we expect investors with satiscing behavior to
put a higher proportion of their wealth into goals with a higher discounted target wealth.
Indeed, as we discussed above, if the initial wealth is high enough, then using the risk-free
strategy will ensure that all investment goals will reached with probability one, and in-
vestors put a higher proportion of their wealth into goals with higher bj. However, when
PJ
j=1 bj > 1, the risk-free strategy causes investors to fails some of their investment goals
for sure. Therefore in this case investors might prefer having some risky assets into their
portfolios and optimal wealth shares will then deviate from bj. We also point out that
when the risk-free strategy fails, then wealth shares w?
j;0 are strictly smaller than bj for all
investment goals. This means that investors decrease the proportion of wealth put into
goal j relative to bj for all investment goals, i.e., instead of using the risk-free strategy
form some goals and risky strategies for others, they prefer to invests into risky strategies
for all investment goals. This is due to their risk-seeking behavior, which is implied by
CPT preferences.
21The question now is how investors decide to split their wealth among investment goals
when the risk-free strategy fails. In other words, on which goals do investors take more
risk and put less wealth if we also account for how ambitious an investment goal is? In
order to take into consideration the importance of one investment goal relative to the oth-
ers, we consider the ratio w?
j;0=bj, which only depends on the characteristics of the market
and the time horizon. We therefore analyze how the ratio w?
j;0=bj changes as function of
the time horizon. The results are reported in the following corollary:
Corollary 2.3. Let  > 0 such that
PJ
j=1 w?
j;0 = 1 and w?


























and the following holds:
(1) If r   log()   1
2 s2 < 0, then the ratio wj;0=bj is maximal for






r   log()   1
2 s2;
increasing for Tj < ^ Tj and decreasing for ^ Tj > Tj with limTj!1 w?
j;0=bj = 0.
(2) If r   log()   1
2 s2 > 0, then the ratio wj;0=bj is minimal for






r   log()   1
2 s2;
strictly increasing for Tj > ^ Tj with limTj!1 w?
j;0=bj = 1, and strictly decreasing for
Tj < ^ Tj.
22(3) If r   log()   1
2 s2 = 0, then the ratio wj;0=bj is strictly increasing for all Tj if
log(=(0 W0)) > 0, strictly decreasing for all Tj if log(=(0 W0)) < 0 and constant









> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
1 if  < W0
0:5 if  = W0
0 if  > W0
We dene the wealth ratio WR0 = W0=
PJ
j=1 W j exp( rTj) as the ratio between
the initial wealth and the discounted value of all target payos. Before we discuss
Corollary 2.3, we briey present here how WR0 is linked to . First, we notice that
1=WR0 =
PJ
j=1 bj. Therefore, when WR0 = 1 then also
PJ
j=1 bj = 1, and all investment
goals can be reached with probability one by simply adopting the risk-free strategy for
all goals. When WR0 is smaller than 1, then
PJ
j=1 bj is larger than 1 and optimal wealth
shares dier from bj. If WR0 is very small, then  must be very large in order to have
PJ
j=1 w?
j;0 = 1. Indeed, w?




j;0 = 1 when
PJ
j=1 bj is much larger than 1. On the other hand, when
WR0 is slightly smaller than 1, then
PJ
j=1 bj is slightly higher than 1 and a small  > 0
is sucient to have
PJ
j=1 w?
j;0 = 1. Therefore, whether  is large or small depends on
how ambitious the investments goals are relative to the initial wealth, i.e., on whether
the wealth ratio WR0 is very small or near to 1. We now use this observation to discuss
23Corollary 2.3.
The quantity r  log() (1=2)s2 can be written as  [ (r + (1=2)s2) + log() + s2],
where  (r+(1=2)s2) is the growth rate of the pricing kernel, s2 its volatility, and  is the
inter-temporal discount factor. Therefore, r log() (1=2)s2 is negative (positive), when
the pricing kernel displays small (high) absolute growth rate, high (low) volatility, and,
additionally, the inter-temporal discount factor is high (small). When these conditions
hold, long-term investing appears less (more) attractive. The results in Corollary 2.3 are
consistent with this observation, as will become clear from the following discussion.
Let us rst consider the case r   log()   (1=2)s2 < 0, i.e., long-term investing is less
attractive. When the wealth ratio WR0 is small enough such that  is larger than W0,
then log(=(0 W0)) is strictly positive and an intermediate horizon ^ Tj exists where the
corresponding ratio w?
j;0=bj is maximal, while it decreases as the horizon increases. Note
that ^ Tj can be large when WR0 is very small, i.e., when the initial wealth is very small
relative to the discounted sum of target wealths the ratio w?
j;0=bj is maximal for a long-
term goals. On the other hand, when WR0 is slightly smaller than 1 such that  is smaller
than W0, then log(=(0 W0)) is strictly negative and the ratio w?
j;0=bj strictly decreases
with the time horizon. This means that in this case w?
j;0=bj is maximal for very short-term
goals, while it is small for long-term goals. Summarizing, when long-term investing is less
attractive, investors put a higher proportion of their wealth (after accounting for how
important the goal is) to long-term goals when the initial wealth is very small relative
to the current value of target payos (goals are too ambitious), while they put a higher
24proportion of their wealth into short-term goals when goals are not too ambitious.
Let us now consider the case r   log()   1
2 s2 > 0, i.e., long-term investing is more
attractive. If WR0 is small enough such that  > W0 and log(=(0 W0)) is strictly
positive, then ^ Tj is negative, i.e., the ratio w?
j;0=bj strictly increases with Tj. It is therefore
maximal for very long-term goals. On the other hand, when WR0 is slightly smaller than
1 such that  is smaller than W0 and log(=(0 W0)) is negative, then ^ Tj is positive.
Therefore, there exists an intermediate horizon ^ Tj where the ratio w?
j;0=bj is minimal,
while it strictly increases for Tj > ^ Tj. Moreover, when  < W0, the ratio is also maximal
equals to 1 at Tj = 0. Summarizing, when long-term investing is more attractive, the ratio
w?
j;0=bj is maximal for very long-term goals and, when goals are not too ambitious, also
for very short-term investment goals. Table 1 summarizes the results in Corollary 2.3.
[Table 1 about here.]
How does the investment strategy just discussed impact the probability of reaching
the investment goals? The answer to this question is given in the following corollary:
Corollary 2.4. Let  > 0 such that
PJ
j=1 w?
j;0 = 1 and w?






















and the following holds:
25(1) If r   log() + 1
2 s2 < 0, then Pj(Tj) is maximal for






r   log() + 1
2 s2;
increasing for Tj < ^ Tj and decreasing for Tj > ^ Tj, with limTj!1 Pj(Tj) = 0.
(2) If r   log() + 1
2 s2 > 0, then Pj(Tj) is minimal for






r   log() + 1
2 s2;
decreasing for Tj < ^ Tj and increasing for Tj > ^ Tj with limTj!1 Pj(Tj) = 1.
(3) If r   log() + 1






> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
1 if  < W0
0:5 if  = W0
0 if  > W0
:
The quantity r   log() + 1
2 s2 can be written as  [ (r + (1=2)s2) + log()]. Thus
r log()+ 1
2 s2 is negative (positive) when the absolute growth rate of the pricing kernel
is small (high) and the inter-temporal discount factor is high (small). If the absolute
growth rate of the pricing kernel is small, bad states of the world are more likely to occur.
Therefore, the probability to reach an investment goal decreases, especially for long-term
goals. On the other hand, if the absolute growth rate of the pricing kernel is large, good
states of the world are more likely to occur and the probability to reach an investment
26goal is higher, especially for long-term goals. Finally, we also see that when the initial
wealth is high enough, (very) short-term goals will be reached almost surely. This is
due to the fact that for very short horizons wealth shares almost corresponds to bj (the
risk-free strategy), as reported in Corollary 2.3. Table 2 summarizes these ndings.
[Table 2 about here.]
We conclude this section with a brief discussion on whether mental accounting is
inecient from the perspective of an investor who integrates investment goals. We restrict
ourselves to the case where all investment goals have the same time horizon, as in Das,
Markowitz, Scheid, and Statman (2009)). In this case goal-based investing delivers the
same optimal terminal total wealth as when investors consider a unique goal with target
wealth equals to the sum of goals' specic target wealths. This result is reported in the
following corollary.
Corollary 2.5. Let 
+





> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
PJ
j=1 W j; if (T) < ?(y)
0; if (T)  ?(y)
where ?(y) = ?(yj) is independent from j. This corresponds to the terminal wealth for
a unique investment goal with time horizon T and target wealth
PJ
j=1 W j.
27Corollary 2.5 implies that goal-based investing with cumulative prospect theory pref-
erences and satiscing behavior is not inecient from the perspective of an investor who
integrates investment goals, when all goals are at same horizon. In other words, investors
who do not integrate investment goals will have strategies that are also optimal for an
investor who integrates investment goals. This result is similar to that reported by Das,
Markowitz, Scheid, and Statman (2009) for the case of goal-based investing with mean-
variance preferences.
3 Numerical Examples
To illustrate the implications of the goal-based model presented in the previous section,
we derive the optimal investment strategy for an investor with cumulative prospect theory
preferences and satiscing behavior.
We assume that the investor has three investment gaols at dierent time horizons.
We assume that W j = $50;000 exp(rTj) for j = 1;2;3 where T1 = 1 year (short-term),
T2 = 5 years (medium term) and T3 = 20 years (long-term), i.e., all investment goals have
the same discounted value equal to $ 50,000. Under this assumption, bj in Proposition 2.3
is identical for all investment goals and thus wealth shares are not aected by the how
ambitious an investment goal is relative to the others.
We specify the investor's preferences assuming 
 
j = 2:25 and j = 0:88 for all
j = 1;2;3 and  = exp(r), while 
+
j is not xed and will determine the degree of loss




j . In our numerical examples we further assume that there is one
28risky asset, that is the market portfolio, with drift  and volatility . The Sharpe ratio
corresponds to  = (   r)=, where r is the risk-free rate of return.
When 
+




j is in the range of 2-4 for
all j, as calibrated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (but also if it is much larger), we
see that the investor optimally puts almost all her wealth in the long-term goal. This
happens also if the degree of loss aversion is much higher for the short-term goal than for
the long-term goal. This is because for cumulative prospect theory investors long-term
investing is very attractive. Figure 1 displays optimal wealth shares as function of 
+
j ,
under the assumption that 
 
j = 2:25 for all j. For 
+
j in the range from 0.6 to 1, which
implies a degree of loss aversion from 2.25 to 3.75, almost all wealth is invested in the
long-term goal. This result is robust with respect to dierent values for the wealth ratio
(0.4 in the top panel and 0.75 in the bottom panel). It follows that in case that the degree
of loss aversion is in the range 2-4, the overall investment strategy almost corresponds to
the long-term investment strategy, as shown in Figure 2.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
We now discuss more in detail the case with 
+
j = 0 for all j, i.e., the investor displays
the statiscing behavior. Figure 3 shows optimal wealth shares at time 0 as function of
the wealth ratio WR0 = W0=
P3
j=1 W j exp( rTj). We assumed r = 0:03,  = 0:2, while
 takes values 0.2 (top panel) and 0.4 (bottom panel), which imply an equity premium
of 4% and 8%, respectively. With r = 0:03 we have W 1 = $51;523, W 2 = $58;092
29and W 3 = $91;106. When the wealth ratio is small (i.e., goals are too ambitious), the
investor puts the largest proportion of her wealth to the long-term goal. However, as the
wealth ratio increases (i.e., goals are less ambitious) the investor mainly invests to reach
short-term goals, i.e., the probability to reach this goal is signicantly higher, as shown
in Figure 4. We also see that when the wealth ratio is small, the probability to reach the
long-term goal is higher. By contrast, in this case, the probability to reach the short-term
goal is small, and the investor adopts aggressive investment strategies for all investment
goals, as shown in Figure 5. Moreover, short- and medium-term goals displays a high
leverage and this is true also for the overall investment strategy. We also note that these
results do not qualitatively depend on the equity premium.
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 6 shows the optimal wealth shares as function of the equity premium. We
xed the volatility  = 0:20 and the wealth ratio takes values 0.40 (top panel) and 0.75
(bottom panel), which correspond to W0 = $60;000 and W0 = $112;500, respectively
(the discounted value of all target payos is $150,000). We see that investors put a higher
proportion of initial wealth into short-term goals as the equity premium increases. Nev-
ertheless, as show in Figure 7, the probability to reach short-term goals is the lowest
when the wealth ratio is low. By contrast, it is the highest when the wealth ratio is high.
Figure 8 reports the investment strategies for all goals and globally (red line). When the
wealth ratio is low, the short-term strategy becomes less aggressive as the equity premium
30increases, while the opposite holds for the long-term strategy. However, in this case, the
overall investment strategy is almost unaected by the equity premium. When the wealth
ratio is high, goals' specic strategies displays similar patterns as when the wealth ratio is
low. However, the overall investment strategy now becomes less aggressive as the equity
premium increases. This is because in this case the long-term goal can be reached with
higher probability and the investor can allocates less wealth to it. Consequently, she can
allocate more wealth to short- and medium-term goals and adopts safer strategies for
those goals. Finally, the impact of short- and medium-term strategies on the overall in-
vestment strategy is stronger and thus the overall investment strategy also becomes safer
as the equity premium increases.
[Figure 6 about here.]
[Figure 7 about here.]
[Figure 8 about here.]
4 Conclusion
In this paper we applied cumulative prospect theory to obtain a goal-based portfolio selec-
tion model, where investors possess dierent investment goals at dierent time horizons.
Our model assumes that investors mentally organize each investment goal as a separate
account and derive optimal investment strategies for each investment goal, ignoring co-
variances between goal-specic portfolios. We derived optimal wealth shares allocated
to each investment goal and optimal investment strategies, when investors additionally
31display the satiscing behavior, i.e., are fully satised when they reach their investment
goals.
We showed that investors mainly invest too reach short-term goals when they are
not too ambitious. However, when goals are very ambitious, they mainly invest to reach
long-term goals and adopt aggressive investment strategies for their short-term goals. In
this case, the overall investment strategy displays a high leverage. Therefore, our model
explains high leverage ratios for investors, who have high incentive to reach ambitious
short-term investment goals.
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35A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
See Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004). We additionally point out that gj(;y) is a
continuous, strictly decreasing function. For y > 0 x, we have limx!0 gj(x;y) = 1 and
limx!1 gj(x;y) =  1. So for each y > 0 we nd a unique x such that gj(x;y) = 0. For
y > 0 x, we denote by ?
j(y) the solution to gj(x;y) = 0.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.1



































1=(1 )   aW + 
  W





















and g(;1) is strictly decreasing, lima!0 g(a;1) = 1 and lima!1 g(a;1) =  1. So,
g(a;1) = 0 possesses a unique solution a > 0 and the statement in the Lemma follows.
36A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.2


















































Moreover, (T)=( 1) is also log-normally distributed with parameters mT=( 1) and






























0 W0 exp( rT) and c = 1



















































?(T)] = 0 w0 W0 , h(y) = w0:
Putting ?(y) = a=y from Lemma 2.1, the statement in the Lemma follows.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 2.1
Follows directly from Equation (2.13) when + = 0.
37A.5 Proof of Corollary 2.2
Let a and y be solutions to Equation (2.12) and h(y) = w0, respectively, given parameters
+ and  . Let ~ + = u+ and ~   = u , while the other parameters are x. Denote by
~ a and ~ y the solutions to Equation (2.12) and h(y) = w0, respectively, given parameters
~ + and ~  . It can be easily shown that ~ a = ua and ~ y = uy. Therefore, ?(~ y) = ~ a=~ y =
a=y = ?(y). Moreover, since the surplus in the good scenario depends on the ratio y=+,
it is also independent from u.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 2.3






































Moreover, (T)1=( 1) is also log-normally distributed with parameters mT=(   1) and









































































A.7 Proof of Proposition 2.2
See Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2004).
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2.3
When 
+
j = 0, we know from Corollary 2.1 that yj = aj exp

 sTj  1 (wj;0=bj)   mTj   s2
Tj

solves hj(y) = wj;0. We put yj into kj and obtain
fj(w0;j) = kj(h
 1
j (wj;0)) = W j 
 

 1 (wj;0=bj) + sTj

:














The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the convex optimization Problem (2.16) with the
additional constraint wj;0  bj for all j are as follows:
1;j  0; 2;j  0; wj;0  0; (A.22)
1;j wj;0 = 0; 2;j (w0;j   bj) = 0; (A.23)
J X
j=1











  1;j + 2;j +  = 0: (A.25)
From Equations (A.22) and (A.25) we obtain:










+ 2;j  0
39We multiply 1;j with w0;j and obtain:















Using that 2;j (wj;0   bj) = 0 we can solve the latter equation for 2;j and we obtain:



























since wj;0  0. Finally, using 2;j (wj;0   bj) = 0 we have
















If  > 0, then wj;0 < bj. Indeed, if wj;0 = bj and  > 0 then condition (A.29) is violated.
Moreover, since wj;0 < bj, then j;2 = 0 by the second Slater's condition in (A.23).
Therefore, w0;j > 0, else condition (A.26) is violated. It follows from Equation (A.30)












and after some re-arrangements we obtain


































holds for all w0;j 2 [0;bj]. Therefore, w0;j = bj by the second Slater's condition in (A.23).
If  = 0 and w0;j 6= bj then w0;j = 0 by Equation (A.30). However, when w0;j = 0
then Equation (A.26) is violated. Thus, also in this case we must have w0;j = bj.
40A.9 Proof of Corollary 2.3
Straightforward implication of Proposition 2.3.
A.10 Proof of Corollary 2.4
Follow directly from Proposition 2.3, Proposition 2.1 and Corollary 2.1.
41Wealth ratio
Small High
( > W0) ( < W0)
1 < 0 ^ Tj 0
1 > 0 1 0 and 1
1 = 0 1 0
Table 1: The table reports the time horizon Tj for which the ratio w?
j;0=bj is max-
imal, as function of 1 = r   log()   (1=2)s2 and the wealth ratio WR0 =
W0=
PJ
j=1 W j exp( rTj). We have ^ Tj =  log(=(0 W0))=1.
42WR0
Small High
( > W0) ( < W0)
2 < 0 ^ Tj 0
2 > 0 1 0 and 1
2 = 0 1 0
Table 2: The table reports the time horizon Tj for which the probability to reach the
investment goal is maximal, as function of 2 = r  log()+(1=2)s2 and the wealth ratio
WR0 = W0=
PJ
j=1 W j exp( rTj). We have ^ Tj =  log(=(0 W0))=2.














































































Figure 1: Optimal wealth shares at time t = 0 as function of the of 
+
j , when the
investor has three investment goals with same discounted value at time t = 0 (i.e.,
W j exp( rTj) = $50;000 for all j) at horizons 1 year (full line), 5 years (dashed line)
and 20 years (dotted line). Investor's preferences are characterized by 
 
j = 2:25 (innite
loss aversion) and j = 0:88 for j = 1;2;3. We have r = 0:03,  = 0:2 and  = 0:2,
which imply an equity premium of 4%. The wealth ratio WR = W0=
P3
j=1 W j exp( rTj)
corresponds to 0.4 (top panel) and 0.75 (bottom panel).































































































Figure 2: Optimal proportion of risky assets at time t = 0 as function 
+
j , when the
investor has three investment goals with same discounted value at time t = 0 (i.e.,
W j exp( rTj) = $50;000 for all j) at horizons 1 year (full line), 5 years (dashed line)
and 20 years (dotted line). Investor's preferences are characterized by 
 
j = 2:25 (innite
loss aversion) and j = 0:88 for j = 1;2;3. We have r = 0:03,  = 0:2 and  = 0:2,
which imply an equity premium of 4%. The wealth ratio WR = W0=
P3
j=1 W j exp( rTj)
corresponds to 0.4 (top panel) and 0.75 (bottom panel).








































































Figure 3: Optimal wealth shares at time t = 0 as function of the of the wealth ratio
WR = W0=
P3
j=1 W j exp( rTj), when the investor has three investment goals with
same discounted value at time t = 0 (i.e., W j exp( rTj) = $50;000 for all j) at horizons
1 year (full line), 5 years (dashed line) and 20 years (dotted line). Investor's preferences are
characterized by 
+
j = 0, 
 
j = 2:25 (innite loss aversion) and j = 0:88 for j = 1;2;3.
We have r = 0:03,  = 0:2. We have  = 0:2 (top panel) and  = 0:4 (bottom panel),
which imply an equity premium of 4% and 8%, respectively.








































































































Figure 4: Probability of reaching the investment goals as function of the of the wealth
ratio WR = W0=
P3
j=1 W j exp( rTj), when the investor has three investment goals with
same discounted value at time t = 0 (i.e., W j exp( rTj) = $50;000 for all j) at horizons 1
year (full line), 5 years (dashed line) and 20 years (dotted line). Investor's preferences are
characterized by 
+
j = 0, 
 
j = 2:25 (innite loss aversion) and j = 0:88 for j = 1;2;3.
We have r = 0:03,  = 0:2. We have  = 0:2 (top panel) and  = 0:4 (bottom panel),
which imply an equity premium of 4% and 8%, respectively.































































































Figure 5: Optimal proportion of risky assets at time t = 0 as function of the wealth ratio
WR = W0=
P3
j=1 W j exp( rTj), when the investor has three investment goals with same
discounted value at time t = 0 (i.e., W j exp( rTj) = $50;000 for all j) at horizons 1
year (full line), 5 years (dashed line) and 20 years (dotted line). Investor's preferences are
characterized by 
+
j = 0, 
 
j = 2:25 (innite loss aversion) and j = 0:88 for j = 1;2;3.
We have r = 0:03,  = 0:2. We have  = 0:2 (top panel) and  = 0:4 (bottom panel),
which imply an equity premium of 4% and 8%, respectively.








































































Figure 6: Optimal wealth shares at time t = 0 as function of the equity premium  r =
 , when the investor has three investment goals with same discounted value at time t = 0
(i.e., W j exp( rTj) = $50;000 for all j) at horizons 1 year (full line), 5 years (dashed line)
and 20 years (dotted line). Investor's preferences are characterized by 
+
j = 0, 
 
j = 2:25
(satiscing behavior) and j = 0:88 for j = 1;2;3. We have r = 0:03,  = 0:2. The
wealth ratio WR = W0=
P3
j=1 W j exp( rTj) corresponds to 0.40 (top panel) and 0.75
(bottom panel).








































































































Figure 7: Probability of reaching the investment goals as function of the equity premium
   r =  , when the investor has three investment goals with same discounted value
at time t = 0 (i.e., W j exp( rTj) = $50;000 for all j) at horizons 1 year (full line), 5
years (dashed line) and 20 years (dotted line). Investor's preferences are characterized by

+
j = 0, 
 
j = 2:25 (satiscing behavior) and j = 0:88 for j = 1;2;3. We have r = 0:03,
 = 0:2. The wealth ratio WR = W0=
P3
j=1 W j exp( rTj) corresponds to 0.40 (top
panel) and 0.75 (bottom panel).








































































































Figure 8: Optimal proportion of risky assets at time 0 as function of the equity premium
   r =   , when the investor has three investment goals with same discounted value
at time t = 0 (i.e., W j exp( rTj) = $50;000 for all j) at horizons 1 year (full line), 5
years (dashed line) and 20 years (dotted line). The total allocation to the risky asset
is given by the red line. Investor's preferences are characterized by 
+
j = 0, 
 
j = 2:25
(satiscing behavior) and j = 0:88 for j = 1;2;3. We have r = 0:03,  = 0:2. The
wealth ratio WR = W0=
P3
j=1 W j exp( rTj) corresponds to 0.40 (top panel) and 0.75
(bottom panel).
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